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CANON 9 OF THE CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: AN
ELUSIVE ETHICAL GUIDELINE
NEIL

D. O'TooLE*

"The Preamble to the Canons of Ethics admonishes the
members of the bar that their conduct should be such as to
merit the approval of all good men. That conduct should not
be weighed with hair-splittingnicety. We have found no exceptions to the exhortation to 'abstainfrom all appearanceof
evil.' Thessalonians 5:22. "1 "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even
the Appearance of ProfessionalImpropriety."2
I.

INTRODUCTION

The motion to disqualify opposing counsel on ethical
grounds has become a familiar part of pretrial litigation.' Thus,
although the disqualification motion is an appeal to the bench
to employ its inherent power to control the professional conduct of members of the bar,4 judges have come to view it as
* B.A. St. Anselm's College; M.A. University of Chicago; J.D. University of Pennsylvania, 1979. Mr. O'Toole is an associate in the firm of Shank, Irwin & Holmes,
Denver, Colorado.
1. United States v. Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1964) (referring to the
Preamble to the ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmIcs which have since been replaced
by the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmnr which was approved in August 1969
and became effective January 1, 1970. 94 ABA REP., appendix 2 (1969)).
2. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmmrr, No. 9 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
ABA CODE].

3. Since 1970 there have been over forty reported federal district court and court
of appeals decisions on motions to disqualify opposing counsel in which Canon 9 of the
ABA CODE, supra note 2, has played a significant part. See, e.g., notes 40, 62 & 106
infra.
4. See Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp. 258, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("The power
of this court to disqualify lawyers is based on the court's general supervisory powers
.... " (footnotes omitted)); See also Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 422
F. Supp. 1057, 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affl'd, 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978); Emle Indus.,
Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 574 (2d Cir. 1973); Empire Linotype School, Inc.
v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 627, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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merely another weapon in counsel's arsenal of litigation tactics.5 Strategically, the successful disqualification movant
stands to gain a substantial advantage over his opponent. Not
only will the adversary lose the benefit of chosen counsel's familiarity with the legal issues in question,' but it is also possible that the court will bar subsequent counsel's use of the disqualified attorney's work product.7 This result can burden even
the "deepest pocket."'8 And as might be expected, it is not
uncommon to find the motion to disqualify employed liberally
in the "big case," 9 or to find the ethical conduct of some of the
largest law firms in the country being subjected to judicial
scrutiny.1 0
5. See, e.g., Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976)
(Ainsworth, J.: "[A]ttorneys now commonly use disqualification motions for purely
strategic purposes. . . ."); International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1289
(2d Cir. 1975) (Gurfein, J.: "Such moves and countermoves by adversaries appear to
have become common tools of the litigation process."); Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1348, 1352 (D. Colo. 1976)
(Finesilver, J.: "[So should the court recognize that a motion to dismiss opposing
counsel itself can be used as an unfair trial tactic.").
6. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 353 (1978) (counsel disqualified approximately twentytwo months after commencement of litigation); IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir.
1978) (counsel disqualified after approximately six years of litigation).
7. See First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390, rev'd and
remanded, 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978) (court en banc rev'd on work product issue).
But see IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978) (upholding a lower court order
disqualifying plaintiff's counsel and permitting a turnover of work product to new
counsel).
8. In the current Westinghouse Corporation uranium litigation approximately 2.5
million dollars in fees had been generated by Westinghouse's counsel before being
disqualified by the Seventh Circuit. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 353 (1978). Since the Seventh Circuit
found that Westinghouse's disqualified counsel may have had access to confidential
information concerning defendant, it is highly likely that Westinghouse's subsequent
counsel will not have access to disqualified counsel's work product.
9. See, e.g., Kroungold v. Triester, 521 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1975) (denial of motion
to disqualify Duane, Morris & Heckscher, Philadelphia, Pa., affirmed); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975) (granting of motion to disqualify Rabinowitz,
Boudin & Standard, New York, N.Y., affirmed); Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1975) (denial of motion to disqualify Rogers & Wells, New
York, N.Y., affirmed); American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir.
1971) (granting of motion to disqualify Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C., reversed); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193 (N.D.
Ohio), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978)
(denying motion to disqualify Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio).
10. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 353 (1978) (denial of motion to disqualify Kirkland & Ellis,
Chicago, Ill., reversed); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225
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In confronting ethical problems raised by the motion to
disqualify, the courts rely principally on the standards delineated in the American Bar Association's Code of Professional
Responsibility.11 By using the Code's nine axiomatic canons, its
aspirational ethical considerations, and its mandatory disciplinary rules 2 the courts have been able to arrive at a reasonable
(2d Cir. 1977) (denial of motion to disqualify Milgrim, Thomajan & Jacobs, New York,
N.Y., reversed; Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Philadelphia, Pa., also implicated).
11. As of October 29, 1974, the ABA CODE, supra note 2, had been adopted by all
states with the exception of California. Note, Attorney's Conflict of Interests:Representation of Interest Adverse to That of Former Client, 55 B.U.L. REv. 61, 65 n.23
(1975) (citing letter from C. Russell Twist, Staff Director of the ABA Standing Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (on file at Boston University Law Review))
[hereinafter cited as Attorney's Conflict]. However, many of the California Supreme
Court's approved rules of professional conduct have been drawn from the ABA CODE,
supra note 2. N. GALSTON, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSILrrY OF THE LAwvaR 221 app. (1977).
Although the ABA CODE, supranote 2, does not have the force of a statute its propositions have both practical ad important effects on the adjudicative process. See, e.g,
Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976) ("As the legal
profession's own source of ethical standards, the Code carries great weight in a court's
examination of an attorney's conduct before it."); Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage
Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (D. Colo. 1976) (Although
the Code does not carry statutory force, it "does set guidelines for the professional
conduct of attorneys appearing before the federal bar."). Cf. Consolidated Theatres,
Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920,926 (2d Cir. 1954) ("But
we think that fundamentally the Canons must be viewed [as] . . . a codification of
the more important limitations on legal practice broadly deemed necessary for the
protection of clients.") (referring to the pre-1970 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 377 n.7 (S.D. Tex. 1969)
("Although the ABA Canons. . . have no statutory force, they are indicative of and
reflect the attitude of the profession as a whole upon the standards of conduct of its
members. . . .") (referring to the pre-1970 ABA CANONs OF PROFESSIONAL ETHcs). But
cf. J.P. Foley & Co., v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1359-60 (2d Cir. 1975) (Gurfein, J.,
concurring) (the court is not obliged to treat the Code as a statute and in areas of
ethical uncertainty is free to make its own decisions in the interests of justice).
The courts seek additional guidance from the Formal and Informal Opinions of the
ABA's Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. See also ABA CoM. ON
ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmIT, RECENT ETHICS OPINIONS; ABA CoM. ON
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEvANCES, OPINIONS.
12. The PreliminaryStatement of the ABA CODE declares:
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the
standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with
the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody
the general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary Rules are derived.
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive. They
constitute a body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in
many specific situations.
The DisciplinaryRules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in
character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:313

degree of consistence in many areas encompassed by the motion to disqualify. For example, many breach of confidence and
conflict of interest problems have been resolved by the enforcement of the specific proscriptions found in Canon 4' 3 and
Canon 514 of the Code. Such consistence provides the practicing
lawyer with a well-defined idea of the type of conduct which
may result in disqualification.
Judicial uniformity has not been achieved in applying all
the norms as found in the Code. This is particularly evident in
the enforcement of Canon 9, which admonishes a lawyer to
avoid the appearance of impropriety. 5 The decisions in which
Canon 9 has been invoked reflect considerable disagreement
over both its scope and application. As a result, the practicing
lawyer has received conflicting messages on what constitutes a
disqualifiable. appearance of improper conduct and may justifiably conclude that he is involved in a game of ethical Russian
roulette whenever the propriety of his conduct is challenged.
With so much riding on the disqualification motion'" such unwhich no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action. Within
the framework of fair trial, the Disciplinary Rules should be uniformly applied
to all lawyers, regardless of the nature of their professional activities. The Code
makes no attempt to prescribe either disciplinary procedures or penalties for
violation of a Disciplinary Rule, nor does it undertake to define standards for
civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct. The severity of judgment
against one found guilty of violating a Disciplinary Rule should be determined
by the character of the offense and the attendant circumstances. An enforcing
agency, in applying the Disciplinary Rules, may find interpretive guidance in
the basic principles embodied in the Canons and in the objectives reflected in
the Ethical Considerations.
ABA CODE, supra note 2, PreliminaryStatement (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
13. ABA CODE, supra note 2, Canon 4 ("A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences
and Secrets of a Client").
14. ABA CODE, supra note 2, Canon 5 ("A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent
Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client").
15. ABA CODE, supra note 2, Canon 9.
16. In his recent book on professional ethics, Professor Hazard has stressed the legal
profession's need for clear guidance on ethical questions:
How the lawyer's function should be conducted admits a wide range of possibility, over which historically and contemporarily there is much debate and difference of opinion, even among persons of admitted good will and personal integrity. The matter cannot satisfactorily be left to individual conscience or vaguely
articulated "traditions of the profession." Hence, it is appropriate and socially
necessary that regulations authoritatively resolve the debated issues, so that
both lawyers and others have a common understanding of expected and permissible behavior in performance of the lawyer's office.
G. HAzARD, ETHICS IN THE PaCmCE OF LAW 5 (1978).
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certainty is disquieting.17
To a large degree commentators on Canon 9 have limited
their analyses to narrow areas of this Canon's application, such
as the problems of conflict of interest or breach of confidence,'
or the ethical issues confronting former government attorneys
in private practice.' 9 Others have analyzed the use of this
Canon by particular federal circuit courts."0
The objectives of this article are to identify the basic issues
raised by Canon 9's application, to scrutinize the various interests affected by such application, to set forth the approaches
courts have used in applying Canon 9, and to point out the
inconsistencies within the courts. Finally, standards will be
suggested which, if adopted by the organized bar, would provide practicing attorneys with clear guidelines for avoiding
improper appearances.
II. CANON 9
Canon 9 of the Code directs all lawyers to "Avoid Even the
Appearance of Professional Impropriety." 2 ' Of the nine axio-

matic norms found in the ABA Code,22 Canon 9 is perhaps the
17. See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
18. See, e.g., Attorney's Conflict, supranote 11; Comment, Ethical Considerations
When An Attorney Opposes a Former Client: The Need for a Realistic Application of
Canon 9, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 525 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Ethical
Considerations].
19. See Comment, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65
GEO. L.J. 1025 (1977) (provides a thorough analysis of current thought on former
government at ttorneys in private practice) [hereinafter cited as Conflicts of Interest].
Cf. Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional
Ethics, 70 HARv. L. REV. 657 (1957) (writing prior to the adoption of the Code's rule:
"A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial
responsibility while he was a public employee." ABA CODE, supra note 2, DR 9-101(B))
[hereinafter cited as Government Attorney].
20. See Note, Disqualificationof Counsel for the Appearance of Professional
Impropriety, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 343 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Professional
Impropriety]; Note, The Second Circuit and Attorney Disqualification-SilverChrysler Steers a New Direction,44 FORDHAM L. REv. 130 (1975).
21. ABA CODE, supra note 2, Canon 9. Canon 9's "appearance of impropriety"
concept is seen as the formal expression of the older "appearance of evil" doctrine
which evolved from the ABA and judicial construction of Canon 36 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics. See General Motors Corp. v. City of N.Y., 501 F.2d 639, 649 n.19
(2d Cir. 1974); Conflicts of Interest, supra note 19, at 1040 n.82; ProfessionalImpropriety, supra note 20 at 345 n.7. See also ABA CODE, supranote 2, Canon 9 n.5 (quoting
Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 93, 84 N.W.2d 136, 145
(1957)(quoting ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETmIcs, OPnONS, No. 49 (1931) which

used the words "impropriety" and "evil" interchangeably)).
22. See note 12 supra.
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most difficult to apply because it necessarily invokes competing value judgments.? Since the pre-Code Canons of Professional Ethics 24 did not explicitly deal with the problem of impropriety, the ABA's adoption of Canon 9 in 196925 was an
innovative and potentially controversial attempt to sensitize
the legal profession to the perceptions of the public and to
bolster public confidence in the judicial system. 6
Three basic issues are raised by Canon 9's application.
First, is Canon 9 intended to be used within the context of
litigation or is it only intended to serve as an axiomatic guideline to the practicing attorney? Second, from whose perspective
is the propriety of appearances measured? Third, can improper
appearances alone suffice to trigger disqualification of opposing
counsel?
Canon 9 is premised on a recognition that avoiding only
actual impropriety is insufficient to instill in the public mind
a sense of confidence and trust. Therefore, even actions which
appear to be "improper" must be avoided.? It is this very concentration on "appearance" which makes Canon 9 controversial and potentiates further confusion in an already murky
subject of legal ethics. Nonetheless, courts have not hesitated
to invoke Canon 9 in determining the appropriateness of attorney conduct, even where its applicability has not been explored
28
in briefs addressing the motion to disqualify.
23. One observer has commented: "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance
of Professional Impropriety (Canon 9) is a statement that cannot be made without so
many qualifications that the principle is in danger of being swallowed by them." A.
KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 31 (1976).

24. See note 1 supra.
25. Id.
26. The ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETIcs, adopted in 1908, were primarily
concerned with the lawyer's duty to the court, his client, and his fellow professionals,
and not with the public's perception of the legal profession. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL
ETHmICS 309-25 (1953) (listing the forty-seven Canons of the CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL

ETHICS).
27. See ABA CODE, supra note 2, Canon 9 n.1 (quoting Erwin M. Jennings Co. v.
Di Genova, 107 Conn. 491, 499, 141 A. 866, 868 (1928). See also Armstrong, Codes of
Professional Responsibility, in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS
(D. Ream ed., ABA 1978). Cf. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
RECENT ETmcs OPINIONS, INFORMAL OPINION, No. 1331 (1975) (indicating that although
there are no clearly controlling provisions prohibiting a firm from appearing before a
judge because one member of that firm might simultaneously be defending that judge
in another action, such a representation might give the appearance of impropriety and
should be avoided).
28. The courts have applied Canon 9 even where the victorious party has not
briefed it. See, e.g., Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972),
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The position of the organized bar concerning the necessary
indicia of an appearance of impropriety has not been uniform.
One influential segment of the bar has cautioned against the
literal application of Canon 9 to ethical problems arising from
litigation. In a footnote to a Formal Opinion of the ABA's Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility it was
stressed that the appearance of impropriety was too vague a
test to be helpful to either the courts or practicing lawyers in
deciding ethical issues. " The Committee noted that the phrase
"appearance of professional impropriety" did not appear in
Canon 9's mandatory Disciplinary Rules and suggested that:
had [it] been included as an element in the disciplinary rule
[DR9-101B] it is likely that the determination of whether
particular conduct violated the rule would have degenerated
from a determinationof the fact issues specified by the rule
into a determination on an instinctive, ad hoc or even ad
hominem basis .... 30
The Committee believed that Canon 9's broad language could
be overzealously applied to conduct of former government attorneys now in private practice. This would unreasonably deprive clients, of the right to counsel of their choice, while severely restricting the attorney's career opportunities. 1 Those
segments of the bar not sharing this view strongly believe that
such "watering" of Canon 9 represents an unwarranted withdrawal from the underlying concerns which prompted its adoption. They contend that the interests of the public would be
better served by focusing on "appearance" alone so as "to avoid
the necessity of asserting and the extraordinary difficulty of
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
29. ABA COMM. ON ETmcs AND PROrESSIONAL RESPONSInILITY, REcENT ErnIcs OpIN-

IONS, FORMAL OPINION, No. 342, at 5 n.17 (1975) (concerning the effect of Canon 9 on
former government attorneys entering private practice) [hereinafter cited as FORMAL
OPINION 342].

30. Id. (referring to ABA CODE, supra note 2, DR9-101(B), which prohibits an
attorney from accepting private employment in a matter for which he had substantial
responsibility as a public employee) (emphasis added).
31. FORMAL OPINION 342, supranote 29, at 10. Similar concerns have been expressed
by other commentators on Canon 9. See Ethical Considerations,supra note 18 (discussing the balancing approach used by some courts confronted with Canon 9 problems); ProfessionalImpropriety, supra note 20, at 344 ("Three competing interests can
be clearly recognized: [i]
the litigant's interest in freely selecting the counsel of his
choice; [ii] the former client's interest in preventing even inadvertent disclosure of
confidential information acquired by the attorney in the course of his former representation; and [iii] the public interest in maintaining the highest standards of professional conduct and the scrupulous administration of justice." (Footnotes omitted)).
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proving. . . that a particular lawyer has in fact committed an
impropriety."3 2
Due to the organized bar's conflicting perceptions of the
scope of Canon 9, the judiciary has not received clear guidance
concerning its application. Consequently courts have developed individualized approaches to the "appearance of impropriety" concept. The federal district courts, and in particular
the courts of appeals, have been quite active in this regard.3
32. D.C. Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Tentative Draft Opinion for Comment:
Inquiry 19, Dist. Law. 39, 40 (Fall, 1976). The Tentative Draft recommended that
"when an attorney is disqualified from a matter because of substantial responsibility
in that matter while a government employee, the partners and associates of that lawyer
should also be disqualified." Id. at 39. This recommendation ran contrary to the
conclusion reached by the ABA in FORMAL OPINION 342, supra note 29, at 11-12, and
was rejected by the D.C. Bar Ethics Committee Recommendation on Former Government Attorneys in Private Practice, Dist. Law. 46 (Winter 1977). Permitting the firm
of a disqualified lawyer to continue representation of a client once a member of that
firm has been disqualified is a departure from the per se rule disqualifying all members
of the firm once one of its members is disqualified. See, e.g., Consolidated Theatres
Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954); General
Elec. Co. v. Valeron Corp., 428 F. Supp. 68 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian
Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314, 1318 (D. Hawaii 1975); Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp.
258, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Conflicts of Interest, supra note 19, at 1044;
Government Attorney, supra note 19, at 662. But see Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage
Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Colo. 1976); Note,
UnchangingRules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-Firm Conflicts
of Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058 (1964); Akerly v. Red Barn Sys., Inc., 551 F.2d 539, 544
(3d Cir. 1977) (court unwilling to disqualify plaintiff's attorney though local co-counsel
disqualified).
33. The district courts enforce the ABA CODE because they have power to regulate
the conduct of attorneys and have incorporated the ABA CODE into their own rules.
See, e.g., Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (per
curiam), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976) (reversed on recovery
for legal services only). The appellate review of district court rulings on the motion to
disqualify is based on the collateral order doctrine, the cornerstone of which can be
found in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) ("This
decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determines claims of right
separable from, and collateral to, rights . . . too important to be denied review and
too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred
....
"). See, e.g., Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 570-71
(2d Cir. 1975); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800,
802, 804 (2d Cir. 1974), affl'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975). As to the standard of review
of district court dispositions of the motion to disqualify, the appeals courts generally
recognize that the trial courts have considerable discretion. See, e.g., Schloetter v.
Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976). Thus, the appeals courts will refuse
to disturb the trial court's ruling unless this discretion is abused. See, e.g., Richardson
v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
However, the circuits vary in the level of deference paid to a trial court's decision. The
Third Circuit has reasoned that disqualification motions often present purely legal
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The result has been that the circuits have evolved seemingly
contradictory approaches to the application of Canon 9. To
aggravate matters further, it is often difficult to determine
what precisely the various courts consider "appearances of
impropriety" as this Canon is generally invoked in conjunction
with other Canons of the Code.34
Since 1970 there have been over forty federal district or
appellate court cases in which Canon 9 has played an integral
part in rulings on the motion to disqualify counsel. 35 Analysis
of these cases suggests that three distinct judicial approaches
in the application of Canon 9 are emerging. 36 Each method
places different priorities on the five often conflicting interests
which can be identified when the motion to disqualify is based
on the appearance of impropriety. These interests are:
1. The public's and the legal profession's interests in maintaining the highest standards of professional conduct and in
ensuring the scrupulous administration of justice;
2. The litigant's interest in freely selecting counsel and in
maintaining an uninterrupted attorney-client relationship
throughout the course of litigation;
issues, and in such instances trial court dispositions should be subjected to full appellate review. See Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Kroungold v. Triester, 521 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1975). Thus,
this circuit has recently suggested that the district courts must specify the basis for
their disqualification decision. Kreda v. Rush, 550 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1977). On the other
hand, the Fifth Circuit has indicated that the district court's ruling should not be
disturbed unless it can be said to be "clearly erroneous." Woods v. Covington County
Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976). The Tenth Circuit at one point determined that
the discretion of the trial judge "will not be disturbed on appeal except in the most
extreme of cases." Waters v. Western Co. of North America, 436 F.2d 1072, 1073 (10th
Cir. 1971).
34. The weight of authority seems to support the notion that motions to disqualify
based on a Canon 9 "appearance of impropriety" must necessarily be supplemented
by reference to other canons. See, e.g., International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d
1288 (2d Cir. 1975). In fact, of over forty reported disqualification motions in the
federal system where the "appearance of impropriety" concept has been dealt with this
writer was only able to find three cases where disqualification was based primarily on
"appearances." These are: Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1977);
Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
830 (1977); Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Canon 9 is most
frequently applied with either Canon 4 which is designed to protect the confidential
relationship between attorney and client (ABA CODE, supra note 2, Canon 4) or Canon
5 which is directed at avoiding attorney participation in areas where a conflict of
interest arises, including personal conflicts and those between a current client and
either a current or former client. ABA COD, supra note 2, Canon 5.
35. See notes 40, 62 & 106 infra.
36. These are the "purist," "moderate," and "pragmatic" approaches. See note 39
infra, developed fully in Section I.
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3. The public's and the legal profession's interest in preventing inadvertent disclosure of confidential information
acquired in the course of a former representation and in
avoiding possible conflicts of interest;
4. The social policy interest vindicated by litigation which
may be thwarted if the motion to disqualify is granted," and
finally;
5. The practicing attorney's career interests.
The following sections will demonstrate how the judiciary
has coped with the application of Canon 9's broad language
within the context of the adversary process, and how the courts
have weighed the above five competing interests in reaching
their decisions. It is hoped that this discussion will sensitize the
reader to the lack of uniformity which results when the legal
profession attempts to ensure that the conduct of its members
"merit[s] the approval of all good men.""
Ill. THE THREE APPROACHES
The three distinct judicial approaches utilized by the courts
in determining the motion to disqualify counsel for an appearance of impropriety will be termed the "purist", "moderate"
and "pragmatic" approaches. 9
The "purist" approach applies Canon 9 literally. It recognizes Canon 9 as a forceful manifestation of the legal profession's desire to ensure public confidence in the legal system.
The courts following this approach favor a strict enforcement
of Canon 9's proscriptions, and perceive public confidence in
the legal profession to be of paramount importance. Any
37. For example, disqualification of plaintiff's counsel in a civil antitrust suit
would adversely affect plaintiff and inhibit the furtherance of antitrust policy interests. See also Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976) ("[Ain
inflexible application of Canon 9 would frequently defeat important social interests
including. . . the government's need to attract skilled lawyers."). Id. at 812.
38. United States v. Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1964).
39. These identifications are based on definitions for the following words:
"purism," "moderate," and "pragmatic." These words are defined as follows:
purism: 1: rigid adherence to or insistence on purity or nicety (as in literary style
or use of words).
WEBSTER's THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1846 (1961).
moderate: 1: one who holds moderate views, especially in politics or religion (the
middle-of-the-road -s in the world. . . who wanted both stability and liberalism-W.G. Carleton) . ...
Id. at 1451.
pragmatic: 4: PRACTICAL, MA'ITER-OF-FACT
Id. at 1781.
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doubts regarding the need to disqualify a participating attorney are resolved in favor of disqualification." Thus, the axiomatic norm of "Avoiding Even the Appearance of Professsional
Impropriety"41 is given the force generally accorded only to the
2
Code's Disciplinary Rules.
This approach embodies a certain pristine attractiveness
which does not lend itself to pragmatic considerations. Instead,
a determined effort is made to keep the conduct of the legal
professional beyond reproach, even if this requires disrupting
litigation by disqualification of counsel. Fundamental to the
"purist" position is the concern that not only should those
parties before the bench actually receive justice but also that
the public perceive that justice is being done.43 Therefore, the
actual legality of the conduct of attorneys is sublimated to the
issue of how this conduct might appear to members of the
public.
The "'purists" faithfully adhere to the proposition that the
legal professional should abide by strong ethical standards not
subject to picayune differentiations or technical distinctions."
40. In the following cases the motion to disqualify counsel was apparently granted
solely because the courts wished to avoid any appearances of conduct which could be
construed by the public as improper: Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 9396 (7th Cir. 1977) (plaintiffs' counsel in a class action disqualified where the class
representative was a close professional associate of plaintiffs' counsel); Kramer v.
Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1091-93 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830
(1976) (disqualifying firm of an attorney maintaining a class action from acting as a
counsel to the class in order to avoid the public's construing such representation as
improper); Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp. 258, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (despite no
showing of Code violation, disqualification of plaintiff's law firm granted in order to
protect the status of the legal profession).
41. ABA CODE, supra note 2, Canon 9.
42. See note 12 supra.
43. Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1088 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 830 (1976) (quoting from 2 J.B. ATLAY, VicroRiAN CHANCELLORs 460 (1908)).
44. George Sharswood, Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, in his 1854 lectures on professional ethics to law students at the University of Pennsylvania remarked that:
There is, perhaps, no profession, after that of the sacred ministry, in which a
high-toned morality is more imperatively necessary than that of the law. There
is certainly, without any exception, no profession in which so many temptations
beset the path to swerve from the line of strict integrity ....
G. SHARSWOOD,A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE Aims AND Du'rms OF THE PROFESSION OF
THE LAW 2 (1854). See alsoH. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 3-5 (1953); GovernmentAttorney,
supra note 19, at 657 ("The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in
general terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their redrawn. . . for the "good man", or the ethical man, as buoys to assist him in charting
his professional conduct."). See Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 574
(2d Cir. 1973); Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 422 F Supp. 1057, 1060
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Opinions which apply the "purist" approach approve of precedent which gives the judiciary wide discretion to police the
ethical conduct of the bar. Courts utilizing this approach have
felt compelled to disqualify counsel on the basis of
"appearance," despite the absence of technical violation of
accepted ethical principles.45
For instance, appearance played the dominant role in the
Third Circuit's decision to disqualify plaintiff's counsel in
Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp.46 The question confronting
the court in Kramerwas whether a member of the bar, Mitchell
L. Kramer, acting as class representative, could designate
members of his law firm as his counsel in a class action.4 7 Since
the court accepted Kramer's statement that he was not the de
facto attorney and that he would not share in any court
awarded attorney's fees should the class action prove successful,46 the court decided that the representation by Kramer's
firm did not create a technical conflict of interest which would
require disqualification under Canon 5.49 Nevertheless, fearing
that the public might perceive a conflict of interest, the court
held that the Code and Canon 9 in particular mandated disqualification. 0
Throughout the opinion the court was careful to absolve
Kramer and his associates of any wrongdoing. The court went
so far as to praise Kramer for demonstrating "an awareness of
fealty to the spirit of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility." 51 Despite this laudatory language, it appears that
the court succumbed to criticism that "the paramount motivation of [class action] litigation was counsel's desire to generate
substantial fees." 52 As a result, the Third Circuit felt compelled
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978); Empire Linotype School, Inc. v.
United States, 143 F. Supp. 627, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
45. See note 34 supra.
46. 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
47. Id. at 1086.
48. Id. at 1089.
49. Canon 5 declares: "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client." ABA CODE, supra note 2, Canon 5. Since this opinion
makes no reference to Canon 5 it seems reasonable to assume that the court considered
its application to be inapposite.
50. 534 F.2d at 1093. Accord, Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 93-96 (7th
Cir. 1977). Cf. Doe v. A Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per curiarn
sub nom. Hall v. A Corp., 453 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1972) (relying almost exclusively on
ABA CODE, supra note 2, Canon 4).
51. 534 F.2d at 1090.
52. Id. at 1090-91.
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to protect the profession against allegations of self-dealing and
to avoid improper appearances. It did this by disqualifying
Kramer's firm.
Reasoning similar to that in Kramer was applied by a district court in Handelman v. Weiss.53 Their attorney Chester
Salomon, while associated with a New Jersey law firm, represented a trustee appointed by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) to oversee the liquidation of a corporation with which defendants had been associated.5 ' In the course
of his work Salomon had been authorized to interview and
depose defendants on matters pertaining to an ongoing Security and Exchange Commission investigation of that corporation.5 By the time the Handelmanlitigation commenced Salomon had severed his relationship with his firm and had established a law firm which was retained by the plaintiffs. The
court found that the position of SIPC trustee representative did
not create an attorney-client relationship between Salomon
and the corporation, and did not make Salomon a government
employee even though SIPC was linked with the Securities and
Exchange Commission." Therefore, it was unable to find that
Salomon had violated the Code's Disciplinary Rules proscribing government officials from utilizing the position for special
advantages.5 7 Nevertheless, it determined that Salomon's representation of the plaintiffs created "at the very least, an appearance of impropriety."" Specifically, concern was expressed
that permitting such representation by a former trustee representative could undermine public confidence in SIPC and chill
53. 368 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
54. Id. at 260-61. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) was created by the Securities Investors Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc (1976) as a
non-profit corporation composed of registered brokers and dealers and members of the
national securites exchange. One of its purposes is to develop procedures for detecting
the potential financial difficulties of its members. Id. at 260, 263.
55. 368 F. Supp. at 261.
56. Id. at 262-63.
57. Id. at 261-62.
58. Id. at 263. Since Salomon had never represented defendants the court declined
to apply Canon 4 ("A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a
Client," ABA CODE, supra note 2, Canon 4) or Canon 5 ("A Lawyer Should Exercise
Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client," ABA CODE, supra note 2,
Canon 5) of the ABA CODE. Further, since Salomon was not technically a government
employee the court found the application of DR 9-101(B) ("A lawyer shall not accept
private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he
was a public employee," ABA CODE, supra note 2, Canon 9) to be inapposite. Id. 26263.
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candor in the liquidation proceedings that SIPC monitored.
Further, it might prompt other attorneys similarly situated to
be less arduous in their investigative duties to the trustee and
tempt them to concentrate instead on developing support for
prospective suits. 9 The court felt that public policy and the
integrity of the legal profession commanded the application of
prophylactic measures to avoid any "appearance" of wrongdoing. By disqualifying Salomon it clarified its position that
"questionable behavior will not be permitted merely because
it is not directly covered by the Canons.""
The second approach emerging from Canon 9 decisions is
the "moderate" approach." It recognizes Canon 9 as affirma59. 368 F. Supp. at 264.
60. Id. at 263.
61; The "moderate" approach is exemplified by the following cases: Government
of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1978) (plaintiffs counsel
disqualified where he had represented defendant in a previous action involving substantially the same issues); In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1191 (2d Cir. 1977) (the
propriety of counsel's representing multiple clients subject to the same grand jury
inquiry upheld); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 234-36
(2d Cir. 1977) (plaintiff's counsel disqualified where defendant presented evidence that
plaintiffs counsel had been selected by defendant's former counsel and may have had
access to information which might prejudice defendant's position); Akerly v. Red Barn
Sys., Inc., 551 F.2d 539, 543-44 (3d Cir. 1977) (disqualification of plaintiffs lead counsel not granted where co-counsel had been disqualified on the apparent ground of
"appearances"); NCK Organization Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 134-35 (2d Cir.
1976) (defendant's counsel disqualified to prevent the possible unfair use against plaintiff of confidences received by counsel from former clients); Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind.,
Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1976) (in ordering disqualification the court, while
declaring that doubts should be resolved in favor of disqualification, indicated that a
de minimus appearance of impropriety might be tolerated); Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics
Corp., 532 F.2d 1118, 1119 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (disqualification of one named
plaintiff upheld where that plaintiff had provided legal services to defendant); Gas-ATron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1324-25 (9th Cir. per curiam), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 861 (1976) (reversing district court disqualification order which was based on the
fact that a member of plaintiffs counsel's law firm had, as a young associate, represented defendants in matters unrelated to current litigation); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1975) (refusing to
disqualify plaintiffs counsel although he had been employed as a young associate by
a law firm, which at the time of his employment was being retained by defendant);
Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir. 1975) (disqualifying plaintiffs
counsel in a sex discrimination suit where plaintiff's counsel was also representing an
attorney who had worked for defendant on the case in question in another Title VII
action); Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1975) (disqualification of plaintiff's counsel not granted although counsel had demonstrated
insensitivity to the etiquette of the bar); General Motors Corp. v. City of N.Y., 501
F.2d 639, 650-52 (2d Cir. 1974) (N.Y. City's counsel disqualified where it was shown
that he had had substantial responsibility in a similar action against General Motors
while a federal government employee); Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,
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tive manifestation of the legal profession's desire to ensure confidence in the legal system and its institutions, and concurs
with the "purist" view that the courts should "exercise . . .
leadership to insure that nothing, not even the appearance of
impropriety, is permitted to tarnish . . . [the] judicial process.""2 In theory, the "moderate" approach assumes that the
courts may disqualify counsel because of mere "appearances"
of impropriety even though actual impropriety has not been
shown. 3 In practice however, this power to disqualify is only
invoked when it is necessary to insure absolute fidelity of the
lawyer to his client or to protect against the inadvertent use of
497 F.2d 1190, 1193-96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974) (plaintiffs counsel
in a Security Exchange Act of 1934, 10b-5 action not disqualified although he had
received alleged confidential information from a former member of a law firm which
was a named defendant and which exculpated the former member from any wrongdoing); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 209-12
(N.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996
(1978) (rejecting plaintiffs motion to disqualify defendant's counsel where counsel had
been involved in legal work with plaintiff of a nature completely unrelated to the
current litigation); General Elec. Co. v. Valeron Corp., 428 F. Supp. 68, 74-75 (E.D.
Mich. 1977) (defendant's attorney disqualified because he had been involved previously as plaintiff's counsel in matters substantially related to the current litigation);
Canadian Gulf Lines, Inc., v. Triton Int'l Carriers, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 691, 694-96 (D.
Conn. 1976) (plaintiffs counsel disqualified even though he had rebutted any inference
that in his prior representation of defendant he had received confidential information
which was likely to prejudice defendant); United States Indus., Inc. v. Goldman, 421
F. Supp. 7, 11-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (disqualification of plaintiffs counsel not granted
in a derivative suit against a former director); Koehring Co. v. Manitowoc Co., 418 F.
Supp. 1133, 1136 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (defendant's attorney disqualified as he had previously represented plaintiff in a substantially related matter); In re Special February
1975 Grand Jury, 406 F. Supp. 194, 197-98 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (out-of-state attorney
admitted to practice and permitted to represent subject and nonsubject witnesses in
grand jury inquiry). Cf. Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (2d
Cir. 1976) (in upholding a lower court decision ordering disqualification the Second
Circuit, without invoking Canon 9 but rather other sections of the Code, indicated that
"there is at least the appearance of impropriety where half his [plaintiffs attorney's]
time is spent with partners who are [representing defendant] . ....
"). Id. at 1387.
See also Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 575 (2d Cir. 1973) (plaintiff's
counsel disqualified where he had represented defendant's parent corporation in a
similar action brought by another plaintiff); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469
F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973) (disqualifying an
attorney who had worked for defendant from maintaining a class action against that
defendant); American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1128-29 (5th Cir.
1971) (court refused to use an imputation-on-an-imputation of receipt of confidences
theory to justify disqualifying plaintiffs counsel).
62. Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 575 (2d Cir. 1973).
63. See, e.g., NCK Organization Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1976);
Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 986 (1973).
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confidential information presumed to have been received as the
result of a prior attorney-client relationship."4 Where a potential conflict of interest or breach of confidence is not apparent,
or is attenuated, the "moderates" are willing to balance the
strict application of Canon 9 against the interests of protecting
a client's choice of counsel or of avoiding onerous restrictions
on the career opportunities of lawyers.
These "moderate" courts will generally order disqualification where the motion to disqualify is directed at an attorney
who has previously been associated with the movant, concerning litigation which bears a "substantial relationship" to that
of the attorney's current adverse representation.15 This reasoning is applied not only to situations where the attorney directly
represented the movant,6" but also to situations where he represented a subsidiary of the movant67 Disqualification will be
ordered though only a possibility exists that the attorney in
question could have received confidential information concerning the movant from sources either closely related to or associated with the movant.18 In such situations, while they express
concern that the disqualification will deprive the party of his
choice of counsel, the "moderates" stress the need for strict
prophylactic measures to protect the integrity of the legal sys64. See Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1975)
(suggesting this to be the reasoning behind important Second Circuit cases in which
the motion to disqualify was granted),
65. The "substantial relationship" test was first articulated by Judge Weinfeld in
T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953): "[To

warrant disqualification] the former client need show no more than that the matters
embraced within the pending suit wherein his former attorney appears on behalf of his
adversary are substantially related to the matters or cause of action wherein the attorney previously represented him, the former client." Id. at 268. See ProfessionalImpropriety, supra note 20 at 353 n.47. But cf. Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d
1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976) (suggesting that "the 'substantial relationship' test does not
set a sufficiently high standard by which the necessity for disqualification should be
determined.").
66. See Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 738 (2d Cir. 1978);
Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 532 F.2d 1118, 1120 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam);
Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 986 (1973); General Elec. Co. v. Valeron Corp., 428 F. Supp. 68, 70, 72 (E.D.
Mich. 1977); Canadian Gulf Lines, Inc., v. Triton Int'l Carriers, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 691,
695 (D. Conn. 1976); Koehring Co. v. Manitowoc Co., 418 F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (E.D.
Wis. 1976).
67. See Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1973).
68. Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 234 (2d Cir. 1977);
NCK Organization Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1976); Hull v. Celanese
Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1975).
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tern. The Second Circuit's ruling in Hull v. Celanese Corp."
typifies the approach.
In Hull, plaintiff Joan Hull, an employee of Celanese Corporation, retained the New York law firm of Rabinowitz, Boudin & Standard to represent her in a class action to prosecute
Celanese for its alleged sex-based employment discrimination
practices.70 Approximately six months after Joan Hull had filed
her complaint, five members of the class applied for leave to
intervene in the action. One of these was attorney Donata Delulio, a member of Celanese's legal staff. Delulio intervened
because Celanese had hired a male attorney to fill a position
promised to her which carried a salary higher than the one she
had received when she began to work for Celanese. Delulio also
retained the Rabinowitz firm to represent her but two and a
half months after Joan Hull had filed her complaint.
As a member of Celanese's legal department Delulio had
been actively involved in the preparation of Celanese's defense
in the Hull litigation. 71 It was this involvement which prompted
the trial court to deny Delulio's intervention and to disqualify
the Rabinowitz firm from further participation as Joan Hull's
counsel.72 In affirming the trial court's ruling the Second Circuit expressed concern that Delulio's switching sides might
possibly give the plaintiffs' firm access to confidential information Delulio had received while in Celanese's employ. No actual breach of confidentiality was shown and the court of appeals was apparently satisfied that the Rabinowitz firm had
taken precautionary measures to avoid Delulio's divulging confidential information.73 Nevertheless, the court was willing to
presume a breach of confidentiality "in order to preserve the
spirit of the [ABA] Code.17 Although careful to caution
against a "broad-brush approach to disqualification, ' 75 the
court, evidencing a concern for appearances, reasoned that
"preservation of public trust in the scrupulous administration
of justice and in the integrity of the bar" mandated disqualifi69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975).
Id. at 569.
Id. at 568-70.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 571-72.
Id. at 572.
Id.
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cation of the Rabinowitz firm, notwithstanding Joan Hull's
right to counsel of her choice.76
In contrast, where a substantial relationship between prior
and current litigation is absent, the very courts which call for
the prophylactic application of Canon 9 have also carved out
exceptions, to protect the career interests of practicing professionals and the client's choice of counsel.77
The first of these exceptions is designed to protect the career mobility of young attorneys. As a general rule the confidences of a client given to one member of a firm are imputed to
all members of that firm. 78 Despite this presumption, the motion to disqualify will not be granted using the "moderate"
approach when the motion is grounded solely on the complaint
that an attorney in a firm currently representing a party adverse to the movant was formerly employed as a young associate by a law firm representing the movant. 79 This exception
is premised on the proposition that the relationship between a
young associate and a firm client is not coextensive with that
relationship between the firm as a whole and the client.'"
Therefore, the knowledge of the firm is not imputed to the
associate since the courts feel that this would work a substantial hardship on that attorney's career opportunities and professional mobility.8' Thus, the attorney's prior associateship
does not raise the inference of receipt of confidential information, and the movant must assume a greater burden of proving
that the attorney in question was directly involved in matters
"substantially related" to the current litigation. If the movant
76. Id. This represented a clear rejection of Hull's argument that "in a conflict
between the terms of the Code and an individual's constitutionally protected rights,
the Code must be accommodated in a way which will not transgress upon the fundamental rights of a citizen." Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975).
77. This is nowhere truer than with the Second Circuit where the exceptions listed
on the text have in large measure been formulated. See cases cited notes 102-103 infra.
78. Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); Consolidated Theaters Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 925-26 (2d Cir. 1954). See also Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell
Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978).
79. See Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. per curiam), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,
518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
80. Silver Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 518 F.2d at 756 (2d Cir. 1975).
81. For a discussion of the factors affecting the courts' rationale in this area see
Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-Firm
Conflicts of Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058, 1067 (1964).
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fails to meet this burden his motion must be denied8 2 so as to
avoid "allow[ing] unfounded charges of8' 3impropriety to form
the sole basis for . . . disqualification.
The second major exception is client-oriented. This exception has been invoked to protect ongoing attorney-client relationships where the court is convinced that only an attenuated
possibility exists that the alleged breach of confidence will have
an affect on the litigation before it. In such cases the courts,
while agreeing that it is of "paramount importance '[to maintain] the highest standards of professional conduct and the
scrupulous administration of justice,' "84 give "significant
countervailing consideration" 85 to "the individual's right to be
represented by counsel of his or her choice." 8 In one such instance a court of appeals refused to uphold a lower court disqualification order which relied upon a theory of "double imputation" of receipt of confidences.8 1 In that case the defendant
moved to disqualify plaintiff's counsel on the grounds that a
partner in a law firm representing defendant in matters
essentially unrelated to the instant litigatioi had professionally collaborated with plaintiff's retained counsel in matters
concerning the instant litigation. 8 The court of appeals was
willing to agree that knowledge gained by the firm which had
represented defendant could be imputed to other members of
the same firm. Therefore, the knowledge gained by the firm
was technically imputable to the partner who had been in contact with plaintiff's counsel. 9 However, since there was no indication that the partner in question had actually received the
imputed information, the court was unwilling to extend the
imputation theory to the firm retained by plaintiff. The court
82. Generally in cases where the motion to disqualify is predicated on the fact that
an attorney associated with a firm representing an adverse interest previously represented movant, the burden is on that attorney to show that during his prior association
he was not involved in a substantially related matter. See, e.g., Laskey Bros. v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956).
83. Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 589 (S.D.
N.Y. 1973) (emphasis added), affl'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
84. United States Indus., Inc. v. Goldman, 421 F. Supp. 7, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(quoting Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757
(2d Cir. 1975)).
85. United States Indus., Inc. v. Goldman, 421 F. Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
86. Id. (quoting Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1973)).
87. American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1971).
88. Id. at 1126.
89. Id. at 1129.
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concluded that the "[c]arriage of this imputation-on-animputation to its logical terminus could lead to extreme results
in no way required to maintain public confidence in the bar."' 0
Relying on the client-oriented exception, courts have also
refused to ground disqualification on appearances where the
result would disrupt a long-standing client-attorney relationship. In a recent Ohio district court case, City of Cleveland v.
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., 9' the City of Cleveland
moved to disqualify defendant's counsel in an antitrust suit on
the grounds that defendant's counsel was previously retained
by the City to provide legal advice on the preparation and
submission of municipal bonds issues. Cleveland Electric and
its counsel had maintained an attorney-client relationship for
over sixty-five years and the City was cognizant of this fact
when it retained Cleveland Electric's counsel on the bond issues.9 2 The court noted that the legal questions in the bond
issue required a high degree of specialization and were unrelated to those questions raised by the current antitrust litigation.9" Further, it was convinced that no disclosure of confidential information relevant to the current litigation had in fact
occurred.94 Strangely, the fact that bond counsel is traditionally privy to and often investigates confidential information
held by the bond issuer was not addressed.95 Yet the court
declared that plaintiff was estopped from asserting that the
presence of defendant's counsel created a conflict of interest or
breach of confidence warranting disqualification. This conclusion was based on the court's finding that the city was aware
of this long-standing relationship when it had retained defen90. Id. Though not using precisely this reasoning a similar result was reached by
the Third Circuit in similar circumstances. See Akerly v. Red Barn Sys., Inc., 551 F.2d
539, 544 (3d Cir. 1977) (the motion to disqualify was based on contacts between plaintiffs out-of-state retained counsel and a member of a firm previously engaged by
defendant. Since it was convinced that the attorney from defendant's previously retained law firm had not worked on matters substantially related to the current litigation, the court declined the invitation to disqualify plaintiff's counsel).
91. City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193 (N.D.
Ohio), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
92. Id. at 197.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 209.
95. This aspect of the case is somewhat confusing. Attorneys who have provided
legal assistance to municipalities issuing bonds agree that the bond attorney becomes
intimately involved with the affairs of the city and receives a considerable amount of
information which could be termed "confidential." The court apparently believed that
this was not the case here yet did not address this issue directly. Id. at 202.
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dant's counsel. " In doing so it additionally cautioned against
the promiscuous use of Canon 9 where the facts did not point
to a violation of more clearly defined ethical rules."
The district court in United States Industries, Inc. v.
Goldman " was also unwilling to disrupt a long-term attorneyclient relationship. In United States Industries the motion to
disqualify was grounded on the claim that movant Goldman
had a confidential and fiduciary relationship with plaintiff's
counsel while Goldman was a director and chief executive of
one of plaintiff's subsidiaries." The court found that throughout its contacts with Goldman, counsel for the plaintiff owed
its allegiance solely to the plaintiff corporation. Further, it uncovered no evidence suggesting that plaintiff's counsel had
obtained confidential information which could be used against
Goldman.100 The motion to disqualify was denied 01 despite allegations that this continued representation presented an appearance of a breach of confidentiality.
Other exceptions to the strict prophylactic application of
Canon 9 have: (1) protected the right of an attorney to defend
himself against allegations of wrongful conduct while retained
by movant; 1°2 (2) rejected disqualification where the attorney
in question merely acted with "insensitivity to the etiquette of
the bar;"'0 3 (3) permitted multiple representation of witnesses
at grand jury investigations although such representation suggested a potential for a conflict of interest. 04
The third and final approach embraced by courts is the
"pragmatic" approach, which favors a restricted application of
Canon 9 and views the motion to disqualify as a dilatory and
96. Id. at 204-05, 212.
97. Id. at 205-206 (quoting International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1295
(2d Cir. 1975)).
98. United States Indus., Inc. v. Goldman, 421 F. Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
99. Id. at 8.
100. Id. at 11.
101. Id. at 12.
102. Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974).
103. Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1975).
104. In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Special February 1975 Grand
Jury, 406 F. Supp. 194 (N.D. Ill. 1975). But cf. United States v. Vargas-Martinez, 569
F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding a district court ruling which ordered substitution
of defendant's counsel of choice due to a conflict of interest arising from counsel's
representation of a co-defendant who had agreed to become a prosecution witness).
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disruptive litigation tactic.,,, The "pragmatic" courts express
concern that disqualification premised on an appearance of
impropriety will defeat the very purposes of the Canon and
consider the client's right to employ the counsel of his choice
to be of paramount importance." 6 Such courts are therefore
unwilling to invoke Canon 9 unless a specifically identifiable
transgression has occurred. Additionally, they caution that
when dealing with an "appearance" the courts "must be care105. The cases presenting this position are: Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry
Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 991-93 (8th Cir. 1978) (disqualification of defendant's
firm not granted although members of that firm had been involved in issues substantially related to the current litigation while in government service); Fred Weber, Inc.
v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609-10 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978)
(refusal to disqualify plaintiff's counsel where, while representing co-defendants of
moving defendant in a previous action he had discussed litigation strategy with moving
defendant's then counsel); Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 812-14 (5th
Cir. 1976) (disqualification of plaintiff's attorney not granted in order to avoid depriving plaintiff of his right to chosen counsel); International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527
F.2d 1288, 1294-95 (2d Cir. 1975) (reversing district court's disqualification order of a
defendant's firm, where a former partner of this firm was a named defendant who had
represented plaintiffs in a merger which was the subject of the current litigation);
Greene v. Singer, 461 F.2d 242, 243 (3d Cir. per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848
(1972) (refusing to reverse a district court ruling limiting the role of one of plaintiffs
co-counsels despite defendant's assertion that this counsel handled patent applications
which were involved in the litigation in question); Waters v. Western Co. of North
America, 436 F.2d 1072, 1073 (10th Cir. 1971) (counsel for third party not disqualified
although he had been co-counsel for plaintiff for approximately eight months in the
same litigation before withdrawing and reappearing as counsel for the counterclaimant); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1304-06
(N.D. Ill. 1978) (district court refused to disqualify plaintiff's counsel even though
there was some evidence of a Canon 9 violation created by counsel's representation of
a petroleum producers association to which three named defendants belonged), aff'd
in part, rev 'd in partand remanded sub nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978); Campus Cleaners, Inc. v. Dallas Tailor & Laundry
Supply, [1977-2] Trade Cases (CCH) 161,714 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (disqualification of
plaintiff's attorney not granted although he had provided procedural advice, while a
government employee, against defendant in litigation of a substantially similar nature); Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1977)
(defendant's counsel not disqualified although plaintiff, as an insured of defendant,
had been involved with defendant's counsel in substantially related litigation);
Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp.
1348, 1353-54 (D. Colo. 1976) (the law firm representing plaintiff not disqualified even
though one member of the firm had been). Cf. Baglini v. Pullman, Inc., 412 F. Supp.
1060, 1065-66 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 547 F.2d 1158 (3d Cir. 1976) (plaintiffs' attorney
not disqualified although he was also being retained by a company against which
plaintiffs arguably had a claim. Canon 9 not referred to even though arguably improper
appearances in evidence.).
106. See Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976);
Campus Cleaners, Inc. v. Dallas Tailor & Laundry Supply [1977-2] Trade Cases
(CCH) T61,714 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
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ful not to accept the view of the most cynical as the true voice
of the public, lest we accept a lack of faith in our institutions
as a categorical basis for restricting otherwise quite ethical conduct." 0
The cases representative of the "pragmatic" approach indicate that the proper adininistration of justice often requires
ignoring appearances in favor of fact.' 8 They further suggest
that the burden of dispelling improper appearances may be
met by following procedural safeguards.'09
Among the best articulated expressions of this viewpoint is
that given in Woods v. Covington County Bank by the Fifth
Circuit in overruling a lower court's disqualification order
based essentially on appearances." 0 The motion to disqualify
arose when Naval Commander Robert Dean Woods, a returned
Vietnam prisoner of war, wished to retain counsel to enable
him and his wife to bring an action to recover losses suffered
as a result of a fraudulent investment scheme aimed specifically at returned prisoners of war."' To this end, Commander
Woods sought the advice of the Navy's Office of the Judge
Advocate General."' The Navy was aware of the fraudulant
scheme and was eager to assist the defrauded servicemen. A
severe shortage of resources prevented direct support from the
107. International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1294 (2d Cir. 1975).
Accord, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1304 (N.D.
Ill. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in partand remandedsub nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 353 (1978). The
general tendency of the courts in the "purists" and "moderates" categories was to view
the "public" as being represented by the parties before them. As such, these courts
expressed primary concern over how these parties would perceive the fairness of the
judicial process in which they were engaged. See, e.g., Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d
568 (2d Cir. 1975); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). However, in the "pragmatist" category there is some tendency on the part of
the courts to interpret "public" as referring to the public at large and to review motions
to disqualify from this viewpoint. See Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Corp., 566 F.2d
602, 609 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); Woods v. Covington County
Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976).
108. See, e.g., Waters v. Western Co. of N. America, 436 F.2d 1072, 1073 (10th Cir.
1971).
109. See, e.g., Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d
988 (8th Cir. 1978). Cf. Baglini v. Pullman, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 1060, 1065-66 (E.D. Pa.),
aff'd mem., 547 F.2d 1158 (3d Cir. 1976).
110. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976).
111. This scheme was the subject of a Securities and Exchange Commission suit.
See SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
112. 537 F.2d at 807-08.
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Judge Advocate General's office and Woods was referred to
Attorney Roger J. Nichols.113 Nichols was a reserve officer in the
Corps and an expert in the area of securities fraud. Nichols,
while on his annual two-week tour of duty with the Navy, and
prior to his initial contact with Woods, suggested that the Navy
undertake an investigation to determine whether the prisoners
of war defrauded by the scheme could maintain a private action against persons other than the principals. He volunteered
to supervise this inquiry." 4 The Navy approved his recommendation and asked Nichols to conduct an investigation. Shortly
before Nichols was to return to temporary active duty for this
purpose he was contacted by Commander Woods who requested him to act as Woods' counsel. At that time, Nichols
declined the proferred representation suggesting that Woods
await the outcome of the inquiry.' 5 Upon completion of his
investigation Nichols was again contacted by Woods."I6 At that
point Nichols agreed to represent him on a contingency fee
basis."'
Following the commencement of litigation defendants
brought a motion to disqualify Nichols. The district court ordered disqualification for the following reasons: First, the retention of Nichols who had worked for the Navy in investigating the fraudulant scheme was seen as a substantial advantage
to Woods and a corresponding disadvantage to the defendants;
second, the district court feared that permitting Nichols to
participate in the Woods' action would result in Nichols collecting twice for services rendered, once from the Navy and
once from Woods."18 The district court was convinced that these
two conditions created an "appearance of impropriety" requiring Nichols' disqualification." '
The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that the district
court had improperly applied the relevant ethical standards
and had applied Canon 9's proscriptions too broadly.'"" The
Fifth Circuit determined that Nichols, while carrying out his
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 808.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 809.
Id. at 808.
Id. at 817-18.
Id. at 818.
See id. at 810, 817-19.
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investigation, was acting in the capacity of a legal assistance
officer whose access to information was no greater than that of
a private attorney. Therefore, Woods was not strategically advantaged by retaining Nichols."2 ' The fact that Nichols accepted Woods' offer of employment only after completion of the
Navy investigation was given no weight and the court explicitly
rejected the approach that "an attorney's conduct must be
governed by standards which can only be imputed to the most
cynical members of the public.' ' 2 2 Having found no
"specifically identifiable impropriety,""' the court discounted
the validity of permitting "appearance" alone to trigger disqualification. The court remarked,
Inasmuch as attorneys now commonly use disqualification
motions for purely strategic purposes, such an extreme approach would often unfairly deny a litigant the counsel of his
choosing. Indeed, the more frequently a litigantis delayed or
otherwise disadvantagedby the unnecessary disqualification
of his lawyer under the appearanceof impropriety doctrine,
the greaterthe likelihood of public suspicion 6f both the bar
24
and the judiciary.1
Undoubtedly the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Woods was
substantially influenced by its determination that Attorney
Nichols felt compelled to aid prisoners of war who had suffered
losses as the result of the "vicious and brutal" fraud. 25 However, the Fifth Circuit's ruling was not merely a response to an
isolated situation. It was clearly an attempt to limit the application of Canon 9 so as to prevent unwarranted manipulations
of the doctrine "for strategic advantage . . . because of an
impropriety which exists only in the minds of imaginative lawyers. 12 The result was a flat refusal by the court to exercise
its authority to remedy charges of improper appearances where
it perceived no actual impropriety. 27 In fact, the court in
Woods went so far as to suggest that disqualification could not
121. Id. at 817.
122. Id. at 813.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 813 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 807 (quoting SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla.
1974)). See also 537 F.2d at 809. ("Because of his desire to aid the former prisoners of
war, his familiarity with the case, and his concern that the statute of limitations was
about to run . . .Nichols felt compelled to accept the case.").
126. Id. at 819.
127. See id. at 813.
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be required unless the likelihood of public suspicion of the
judicial process outweighed the social interests requiring that
the lawyer continue his representation.'28
Results similar to that in Woods have been reached in a
variety of situations. For example, in Moritz v. Medical Protective Company, 29 two doctors were suing a defendant insurance
l
company for its failure to appeal several malpractice suits. 3

They moved to disqualify defendant's counsel on the ground
that he had jointly represented one of the plaintiffs and the
defendant in a related malpractice action. 3 1 Counsel had later
withdrawn from this malpractice action in order to represent
the insurer in the pending litigation. 32 Plaintiffs claimed that
this withdrawal and subsequent representation constituted an
appearance of impropriety. 33 The court, finding no actual professional impropriety, refused to disqualify counsel through
128. Id. at n.12. This position was adopted recently by District Court Judge Marshall in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. -1284, 1305 (N.D.
Ill. 1978), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part and remanded sub nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 353 (1978). In
that case the district court refused to order disqualification of plaintiffs counsel. The
facts indicated that the Washington office of plaintiff's attorney had represented an
association of petroleum producers to which three defendants belonged and to which
these defendants had provided confidential information. Id. at 1291-93. In addition,
the court found that there was some evidence that members of plaintiffs firm were
aware that their brothers in Washington were representing the petroleum producers
association. Id. at 1296. Finally, the evidence showed that one of the attorneys who
had prepared plaintiff's complaint had also prepared a memorandum of law for the
association. Id. The court concluded that, although plaintiff's counsel's Washington
office represented the association an attorney-client relationship between the moving
defendants and the plaintiff's law firm never existed. Id. at 1303. Nonetheless, the
court concluded that there was "some evidence of a Canon 9 violation, even without
proof of a formal attorney-client relationship." Id. at 1304. Despite this the court
concluded that suspicion of the propriety of plaintiffs firm's "dual engagement does
not outweigh the social interests which will be served by their continued representation
of [plaintiff] . . . in the current litigation." Id. at 1305. Therefore, defendant oil
companies' motion to disqualify plaintiff's counsel was rejected. Id. at 1306. The Seventh Circuit found that the district court's finding concerning the relationship between
the oil companies and plaintiff's counsel was erroneous and ordered plaintiffs counsel
disqualified. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 353 (1978).
129. 428 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
130. Id. at 869-70.
131. See id. at 872.
132. Id.
133. See id. But see ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 247 (1967)
(indicating that once an insurer has retained an attorney with whom the insured has
co-operated that attorney may not thereafter continue to represent the insurer once a
conflict of interest arises).
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conceding that defendant's counsel may have acted improperly
by terminating his representation of plaintiff.'34
A similar result was reached in the Tenth Circuit where
counsel had represented plaintiff for eight months and then
withdrew to represent a counter-claimant in the same litigation.'35 In that case the lower court's refusal to disqualify was
upheld despite "improper surface appearances" because "the
overall proper administration of justice may well allow the trial
judge to ignore appearance in favor of fact."' 3
The Eighth Circuit declined to apply Canon 9 restrictively
where members of the law firm representing plaintiff in an
antitrust action had previously worked on a related case while
employed by the government.'3 The district court denied defendant's disqualification motion even though it believed that
a literal reading of the Code suggested that there had been 3a8
violation of two of the Code's mandatory Disciplinary Rules,'
DR 9-101(B)'3 9 and DR 5-105(D).' Finding that there was no
allegation of actual impropriety, the circuit court upheld the
lower court's decision."' In an earlier case this circuit refused
to disqualify an attorney on grounds of "appearance" where
plaintiff's law firm had represented codefendants of the movant in a prior suit and the current litigation was substantially
related to the earlier suit.12 The evidence established that the
codefendants in the first suit had agreed to work together to
defend against a criminal indictment.4 3 It was further found
that in the previous litigation the defendants had cooperated
in preparing their procedural defenses but excluded substan134. 428 F. Supp. 865, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
135. Waters v. Western Co. of N. America, 436 F.2d 1072 (10th Cir. 1971).
136. Id. at 1073.
137. Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988 (8th
Cir. 1978).
138. See note 12 supra.
139. ABA CODE, supra note 2, DR 9-101(B) ("A lawyer shall not accept private
employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a
public employee.").
140. ABA CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-105(D) ("If a lawyer is required to decline
employment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner,
or associate, or any lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or continue such
employment.").
141. Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 99193 (8th Cir. 1978).
142. Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 905 (1978).
143. Id. at 696.
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tive matters. The court then distinguished between participation in the preparation for procedural and substantive issues
and held that participation in the former did not require disqualification.' The court asked the question "would a member
of the public, or the bar, see an impropriety in the mere representation of C against B by a lawyer who had represented B's
co-defendant in a prior suit?"' ' It responded in the negative
and refused to "presume a lack of integrity. . . in a knowing
acceptance of a representation against a party from whom, or
about whom, confidential information had been obtained.""'
The Second Circuit, which has done much to conceptualize
the preventative application of Canon 9147 has cautioned
against using "appearance" as the sole basis for disqualification. In InternationalElectronics Corp. v. Flanzer,"I this circuit reversed a lower court order disqualifying a law firm representing the defendant where the defendant, a former partner
in the firm, was likely to be called as a witness against its
former client. The Second Circuit decided that because the
former partner was a party to the litigation and not a witness,
the provisions of the Code requiring a firm disqualification did
not apply.' It refused to invoke Canon 9 because it did not feel
that the facts presented a "particularly acute"'50 question of
improper appearances. Like the Woods court, they stressed
144. Id. at 610.
145. Id. at 609.
146. Id. Accord, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284,
1304 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in partand remanded sub nom.Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 353
(1978).
147. See, e.g., Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.
1978); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975); General Motors Corp. v.
City of N.Y., 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974); Emle Indus., Inc., v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d
562 (2d Cir. 1973).
148. 527 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1975). A similar result was reached in GreenebaumMountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1348, 1354 (D.
Colo. 1976) (refusing to disqualify the firm of a partner who was likely to be called as
a witness and was therefore disqualified from himself representing plaintiff under
Canon 5, DR 5-102(B)).
149. 527 F.2d 1288, 1295 (2d Cir. 1975). The Disciplinary Rules which plaintiff
invoked were DR 5-101(B) ("A lawyer shall not accept employment in contemplated
or pending litigation if he knows or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought
to be called as a witness ..
")and DR 5-102(A) ("If, after undertaking employment
in contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a
lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his client, he shall
withdraw .... ").ABA CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-101(B), DR 5-102(A).
150. 527 F.2d at 1293-94.
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that the application of Canon 9 should not be triggered by
appearances alone which might be viewed as improper by the
more cynical members of the public.' 5' Finally, the Flanzer
court rejected the validity of disqualifying legal counsel based
solely on Canon 9 "when the facts simply to not fit within the
' 52
rubric of other specific ethical and disciplinary rules.'

IV. DiscussIoN
The import of the decisions embracing the "purist" approach is that they provide current precedent for the contention that the courts can and will exercise considerable discretion in disqualifying lawyers whose conduct appears to be only
arguably improper. From a practical viewpoint however, the
zealous exercise of this disqualification power creates difficult
problems making judicial uniformity virtually unobtainable.
Foremost among these difficulties is determining from whose
perspective the appearance of propriety should be measured.
Should it be from that of cynical members of the public...
from the perspective of a judge or sophisticated lawyer. . . or
from the perspective of the citizen who has never participated
in the adjudicatory process? The "purist" approach does not
address this issue. However, the courts in Kramer and
Handelman accorded substantial deference to public perceptions of the attorney's conduct despite the absence of cognizable violations of the Code's mandatory disciplinary rules. By
doing so they open the door to disqualification where there is
merely the possibility that laymen may be affronted by an
attorney's conduct. One cannot deny that the public views the
ethics of attorney conduct with a degree of skepticism.1 3 Yet
to allow courts to exercise authority to supervise all attorney
conduct which falls prey to serious public criticism, seems to
run counter to what is normally deemed reasonable or consistent with due process.'54 Unfortunately, the "purist" approach
151. Id. at 1295.
152. Id. at 1294.
153. See 0. PHILLIPS & P. McCoY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAwYERS IX, 23, 189
(1952); G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
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does not provide a clear limit to Canon 9's application.
Since the courts have inherent power to control the conduct
of members of the bar,155 and since Canon 9 was adopted by the
ABA to ensure public confidence in the legal system,'56 there
is justification for the proposition that disqualification is the
only appropriate remedy when doubt exists concerning the propriety of attorney conduct. However, such a broad proposition
can easily be abused if some limitation on its application is not
adopted. To date, courts using the "purist" approach have
provided little direction in this regard. The result is that the
practicing attorney is not accorded guidelines for determining
the extent to which judicial discretion will be employed when
the propriety of his conduct is called in question.
The "moderate" approach on the other hand is fact and
circumstance oriented. Yet it also lends itself to a substantial
exercise of judicial discretion and the courts following it assume considerable leeway in balancing the various interests
found in litigation. The result is a multitude of decisions which,
while accommodating a broad spectrum of diverse interests,
fails to provide a well-defined doctrinal approach to what constitutes an appearance of impropriety. If one were to analyze
this approach from the perspective of a member of the public,
one might be led to conclude that it is inconsistent with the
ends of justice. For example, the resolution of the ethical question in the Hull case resulted in the disqualification of Joan
Hull's chosen counsel.' 5 7 This left her in a position of having to
pursue her claim of discrimination against a more powerful
opponent without the benefit of the months of litigation experience obtained by her counsel of choice. Certainly it would be
difficult to convince Ms. Hull that she had received fair treatment in the hands of justice. A cynical observer might well
wonder if the Hull case, in fact, stood for the proposition that
submission, it disregards the overriding purpose because the particular occasion
which has arisen, was not foreseen. That there are hazards in this is quite true;
there are hazards in all interpretation, at best a perilous course between dangers
on either hand; but it scarcely helps to give so wide a berth to Charybdis's maw
that one is in danger of being impaled upon Scylla's rocks.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nor. Estate of Wilkinson v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 836 (1947).
155. See note 4 supra.
156. See notes 19 & 24 supra.
157. Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975).
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the little guy does not stand a chance when confronted by the
"technicalities" of the litigation process.
Regarding the exceptions provided by the "moderate" approach, the public might well wonder if the legal profession's
expressed desire to ensure public confidence stops short of a
willingness to interfere with the career interests of its members.
Indeed, should a client feel less betrayed because the lawyer
switching sides is only starting his career?' 58 Should the director of a corporation who has had dealings with a law firm retained by his corporation feel less disgruntled at the prospect
of having to confront in adverse litigation the very firm he has
dealt with professionally? 59 And is not the public justifiably
cynical when the legal profession, which prides itself on maintaining "the highest standards of ethical conduct" allows a law
firm to continue its representation of a longstanding corporate
client when that firm is now locked in adversary proceedings
with an opponent it had recently represented.'
The short, and perhaps most satisfactory, response to such
criticism is that the efficient administration of law and justice
requires that the application of broad ethical assertions be tempered by a case-by-case analysis and an ad hoc balancing of the
interests. However, the very fact-orientedness of the moderate
approach lends little to the formulation of uniform principles
for resolving ethical problems where improper appearances are
in contention.
The "pragmatic" approach represents an exaggerated judicial reaction designed to avoid subjecting attorney conduct to
the close scrutiny which might be suggested by Canon 9's broad
language. As the "pragmatist" cases suggest, the courts embracing this approach are unwilling to accord Canon 9's proscription that a "Lawyer Avoid Even the Appearance of Impropriety" mandatory effect. 6' Since Canon 9 is intended to be
axiomatic and express only "in general terms the standards of
professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships
158. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d
Cir. 1975).
159. See United States Indus., Inc. v. Goldman, 421 F. Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
160. See City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193
(N.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996
(1978).
161. ABA CODE, supra note 2, Canon 9.
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with the public,' ' 12 this approach to its application may technically be correct. On the other hand, the adoption of Canon
9 by the ABA represents a strong manifestation of intent by
63
the profession to uphold its status in the eyes of the public.'
Thus the unwillingness of the "pragmatic" approach to invoke
this Canon to correct arguably improper appearances eviscerates Canon 9's effect on lawyer conduct, and thus runs counter
to its intended purpose.
III. ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION
The lack of uniformity in Canon 9's application raises the
question of whether judicial attempts to define the outermost
limits of Canon 9's application have served either the interests
of the public or those of the profession. It additionally suggests
that the adoption of Canon 9 has generated more problems for
the adjudicative process than it has solved. Nevertheless it is
difficult to imagine that a profession which prides itself on
"maintain[ing] the highest standards of ethical conduct" 64
would be willing to retreat from the general principle that the
actions of its members should "merit the approval of all good
men.' ' 6 5 Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that the profession
would risk the opprobrium which might result from any
attempt to publicly recant from general propositions contained in Canon 9. Therefore, it must be assumed that the
concept of an "appearance of impropriety" will continue to be
a reality with which the practicing attorney must deal.
The organized bar has done little to clarify the profession's
position on the extent to which Canon 9 should be employed
to control the conduct of members of the bar. Granted, it is
easier to find fault with the lack of consistency shown by the
judiciary in applying Canon 9 than it is to suggest specific
formulations as to what constitutes an example of an appearance of impropriety. However, if Canon 9 is to have any positive effect on professional conduct, the organized bar, particularly the ABA and the various state and local bar associations,
must make a concerted effort to address the questions its broad
language triggers.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at PreliminaryStatement.
See notes 21 & 26 supra.
ABA CODE, supra note 2, Preamble.
United States v. Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1964).
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The cases indicate that the application of Canon 9 by the
judiciary will continue to present the spectre of contradictory
adjudication, because of the difficulty in resolving the following issues: From whose perspective should attorney conduct be
judged? How much weight should be given to the fact that an
attorney's disqualification may result in undermining other
recognized social policies? 66' What deference should be accorded to the clients' right to retain counsel of their choice?
Should improper appearances alone suffice to warrant disqualification?
Achieving enduring answers to these questions is unlikely
because what creates an appearance of impropriety is "a question of current ethical-legal mores. 11 6 7 However, the fact that
ethical mores are continually shifting does not blur the profession's avowed objective of avoiding "[e]ven the [a]ppearance
of . . . [i]mpropriety,"' 6' nor does it excuse the complacency
of the bar in permitting the confusion created by Canon 9 to
remain unabated.
To date, the preponderance of judicial authority supports
the proposition that Canon 9 should be curtailed when .its application interferes with a variety of lawyer, client or social
policy interests. The validity of this approach is open to question. Certainly the language of Canon 9 can be perceived as
"all-inclusive, perfectionist and unmerciful. " " It is also clear
that Canon 9 represents a prophylactic proscription designed
to ensure that lawyer conduct can, withstand public scrutiny
and criticism. 170 Therefore, in the absence of contrary interpretive instructions from the bar, the courts are free to assume
that conduct which might arguably be perceived by the layman
as improper should be held to be within the scope of Canon 9.
Lawyerlike technical distinctions should not be relied upon to
excuse questionable conduct. Thus, a literal and laymanoriented application of Canon 9 would seem appropriate even
166. See Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 n.12 (5th Cir. 1976);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1304 (N.D. ill.), aff'd
in part, rev 'd in part and remandedsub nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 353 (1978).
167. Government Attorney, supra note 20, at 660.
168. ABA CODE, supra note 2, Canon 9.
169. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1304 (N.D.
Ill.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded sub nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 353 (1978).
170. See note 26 supra.
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where the career interests of attorneys or the interests of clients
to freely choose counsel are at stake. This is the approach
adopted by the "purists".
Critics of the "purist" approach argue that the application
of stringent Canon 9 standards represents an unwarranted interference with a client's choice of counsel. However, even the
"moderate" and "pragmatic" courts recognize that this interest may have to fall in order to ensure "the scrupulous administration of justice and . . .the integrity of the bar . .
",7.
A more subtly expressed criticism of the "purist" approach
is that its application deprives clients of competent counsel.
Assuming this to be true, any equation which requires the balancing of the client's right to competent counsel with the value
of professional ethics must take account of the ever increasing
pool of lawyers from which clients can draw. When this reality
is fully appreciated, it is difficult to imagine a situation where
the dearth of professional legal services is so significant or the
availability of a competent replacement counsel is so lacking
that it is necessary for the courts and the legal profession to
tolerate attorney conduct which creates an appearance of impropriety. This is not to say that qualitative differences among
attorneys are not relevant in the litigation process; just the
reverse is true. Yet this is a constant aspect of the adversary
process which should not be remedied at the cost of lowering
ethical standards.
The suggestion forwarded by the "pragmatists" that it may
be necessary to lower ethical standards in order to further social policy interests is equally unappealing. Emphasis of social
interests over ethical considerations would require a court to
make favorable assumptions concerning the merits of a particular claim or defense prior to trial. For unless the courts posit
that litigation per se has social policy value they must determine on a case-by-case basis if the social policy interests in
question would be furthered if the disqualification motion is
not granted. By making this determination before evidence is
presented or the adverse party has had an opportunity to present his case the court undertakes a role in conflict with that
of impartial adjudicator.
There is, however, one criticism of the literal application of
Canon 9 which is not easily refuted. Canon 9's terms are admit171. Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir. 1975).
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tedly vague, creating a likelihood that courts will evaluate the
propriety of professional conduct "on an intuitive, ad hoc or
even ad hominem basis. 1 1 72 This in turn can result in inconsist-

ent adjudications and contradictory holdings. Supporters of
the "purist" approach may counter that there are a variety of
legal concepts which are equally vague (e.g. "reasonable man",
"substantial relationship") which the courts have been able to
apply with a reasonable degree of consistency. Case law unfortunately does not support this analogy. Rather, it points out
virtually irreconcilable differences over the importance of
"appearance" in measuring the ethical propriety of attorney
conduct. As a result, Canon 9's application introduces an everpresent risk of unexpected interference with, and disruption of,
the attorney-client relationship and the adjudicatory process.
Experience to date would indicate that the lack of predictability in the application of Canon 9 is unlikely to abate until
the courts refrain from applying its conceptually vague terminology. This is particularly true when the questioned attorney
conduct arguably falls within the province of one of the more
clearly defined ethical norms found in the Code. This does not
mean that the policies underlying the legal profession's adoption of the "appearance of impropriety" should be shunted
aside. Rather, Canon 9 can be used in conjunction with other
ethical standards to ensure that attorney conduct will not be
excused on the basis of technical distinctions which effectively
elevate career interests of attorneys over perceptions of ethical
propriety held by laymen.
As the "moderates" have recognized, concern over
"appearance" arises most frequently where there has been either a prior direct or indirect professional relationship between
the attorney whose conduct is being challenged and the disqualification movantY13 Thus, Canon 9 is invoked to protect
against the "appearance" of a conflict of interest or breach of
confidence in order to preserve the integrity of the previous
attorney-client relationship. Many, if not most, of the problems surrounding the appearance of impropriety could be more
adequately handled via an expanded notion of an attorney's
confidential relationship or conflicts of interest. Under such a
regime the ethical mandate of Canon 9 would become operative
172. See FORMAL OPINION 342, supra note 29, at 5 n.17.

173. See note 66 and cases cited note 68 supra.
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precisely in those cases where the boundaries of other ethical
obligations are being tested. This broad approach would protect the "appearance of impropriety" concept from being subjected to so many qualifications "that . . . [its] principle is
'7 4
in danger of being swallowed by them.'
In view of the controversy exhibited in the case law concerning Canon 9, it is suggested that the organized bar adopt the
following guidelines. These guidelines would help eliminate
judicial decisions inconsistent with Canon 9's avowed purpose
and permit the courts to avoid entering the difficult area of
determining when an "appearance of impropriety" exists.
First, no matter the size of the firm, or the nature of the
suit, it should be considered inappropriate for a firm, or any
partners thereof, past or present, to represent an adverse party
against a former or current client. This would preclude even the
appearance of possible breach of confidence or conflict of interest similar to that which occurred in City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric IlluminatingCo. 75 or Flanzer,,76 and would avoid
abstract analyses of the sort required by the "substantial relationship" test.' 77 This proscription is directed at past or present
partners and would not cover law associates unless they had
been partners in another firm prior to their current associateship.
Second, where a lawyer while a law associate in another
firm has worked directly with a client neither he nor his current
firm may represent another party in litigation against that
client. Thus, disqualification would be proper where the attorney worked directly with the current adverse party during his
associateship, even if the subject matter of the former relation78
ship is unrelated to the current action.
Third, lawyers will not abandon one client to represent an174. A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 31 (1976).
175. 440 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
176. 527 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Waters v. Western Co. of N. America,
436 F.2d 1072 (10th Cir. 1971).
177. See note 65 supra.
178. This rule would qualify the holding in Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 758 (2d Cir. 1975), where the court refused to order
disqualification of plaintiff's attorney although that attorney had worked directly with
defendant on procedural matters not substantially related to the current act while he
was a law associate with the firm retained by defendant. Under such circumstances
access to confidential information relevant to the current litigation will be presumed.
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other in the same or related litigation, even where the lawyer
has had a long-standing attorney-client relationship with that
other client. 9
Fourth, if a law partner representing a party in current
litigation becomes aware that another of his or his firm's clients
is likely to become an adverse party in either the current litigation or in a related suit, that lawyer and his firm must withdraw completely from representing any party in that matter. "'0
Withdrawal in such circumstances could have avoided the difficulties found in City of Cleveland v. Cleveland ElectricIlluminating Co., and a variety of other situations.'8 '
Fifth, a lawyer who shares in the preparation of either procedural or substantive matters in a multi-party defense should
be unable to represent a plaintiff (or defendant) in a suit
against a codefendant involving issues substantially related to
2
the former codefense representation.'1
Criteria of this sort could be used not only by the courts in
arriving at a more uniform resolution of ethical problems and
issues but also by lawyers in monitoring their own conduct so
as to avoid controversial situations. These objective criteria
might be considered too stringent by some segments of the bar.
They admittedly may restrict the client's right to counsel of his
choice, the furtherance of social policy interests, and the lawyer's professional mobility. Yet attempts by the judiciary to
moderate, and in some instances to eviscerate, the impact of
the "appearance of impropriety" concept by reducing its con179. Thus, a lawyer who had represented a claimant in an action, could not withdraw to represent a counter-claimant in the same action as was permitted in Waters
v. Western Co. of N. America, 436 F.2d 1072 (10th Cir. 1971). Nor could he represent
a long-standing client against a more recent client in litigation related to the more
recent representation as was tolerated in Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F.
Supp. 865 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
180. The mere possibility that a current client would become an adverse party
would not require withdrawal. A standard that required withdrawal for mere possibility would run into difficulty any time a class action was brought, since the number of
potential adversaries in such action is often limitless.
181. See, e.g., Baglini v. Pullman, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem.,
547 F.2d 1158 (3d Cir. 1976) (where plaintiff s attorney had formerly represented plaintiff's employer against whom plaintiff had an arguable claim). See also Moritz v.
Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Wis. 1977) (where defendant's attorney had previously agreed to represent plaintiffs in a suit related to the current action
against defendant).
182. See Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978) (where court found itself confronted with the need to make
blurred distinctions between procedural and substantive issues to justify its decision).
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flict with these interests is precisely what caused the absence
of cohesive guidelines which are in accord with the prophylactic spirit of Canon 9. Admittedly some deference should be
accorded to a client's choice of counsel in the context of the
motion to disqualify. However, the significance of this interest
must be measured in light of the current availability of competent replacement counsel. As to social policy considerations,
the pursuit of these concerns during the pretrial stages of litigation at the expense of ethical standards has doubtful validity.
Finally, with regard to the career interests of lawyers, it seems
reasonable that these interests give way to more important
ethical considerations when the two come in conflict. After all,
these considerations contribute toward making legal careers
possible.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It may be that the proposition embodied in Canon 9 is too
vague for consistent application. However, the profession's
avowed goal of ensuring that the conduct of its members does
not appear improper in the eyes of the public should not be
summarily shunted aside because other interests may suffer.
Protecting the integrity of the legal profession cannot be done
without cost and the responsibility for determining where these
costs must fall rests with the organized bar. Surely the time has
come for the bar to explain to its members the significance of
Canon 9's proscription and to clearly delineate standards of
conduct consistent with its application.

